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We evaluate the influence that employment promotion measures and labour market intermediation services ad-
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techniques. Our focus is placed on two aspects of quality: the type of contract held (either permanent or temporary)
and whether or not the individual is searching for another job. We find that those measures do not improve the qual-
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1. Introduction
The objective of this article consists of analysing the effects of policies designed to pro-
mote the employment of people with disabilities on the quality of their job match. In particu-
lar, we focus on employment promotion measures and labour market intermediation services
addressed to this population. It is widely known that disabled individuals undergo a situation
of wage discrimination and negative prejudices, and that their participation rates in the la-
bour market have remained lower than those of non-disabled individuals —the degree of
which depends on the type of disability under consideration. Some previous research sup-
porting these statements can be found, for instance, in Baldwin and Johnson (1995), Loprest
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2005). The usual disclaimer applies.et al. (1995) or Kidd et al. (2000). In many countries, several policies have been imple-
mented to countervail their disadvantaged position in the labour market. There exist two
wide groups of policies addressed to disabled individuals: on the one hand, income transfer
programmes; on the other hand, employment promotion measures. The former have already
been the subject of several studies (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). However, the use of em-
ployment promotion measures has been much scarcely analysed in the literature (see Corden
and Thornton, 2002, for a review of evaluations in different countries).
Our study constitutes a novelty in the current literature, given that (up to our knowledge)
there is no previous research on the relationship between employment promotion measures
and the quality of the job match for persons with disabilities. Its interest also lies on the fact
that in order to ascertain the job quality of disabled individuals, focusing only on their em-
ployment or re-employment probability which follows from employment promotion mea-
sures would offer a partial analysis. This would be the case in so far as a precarious entry into
the labour market were regarded as successful when compared to unemployment, since it
must be taken into account that workers with a poor quality match might be dismissed in the
first place whenever a crisis begins. Therefore, not only the entry or re-entry into employ-
ment is a subject of concern when analyzing disabled people’s labour careers. For this rea-
son, we will not consider the effects of employment promotion measures on individuals’ job
finding success, but on their job quality success. Two proxies for the quality of the job match
are used. On the one hand, the type of contract held —either open-ended or temporary; this
variable constitutes an «objective» (or «demand-side») measure to the extent that it is sensi-
ble to assume that open-ended contracts are associated to better matching quality than tem-
porary contracts. On the other hand, a «subjective» (or «supply-side») measure is given by
whether or not disabled workers are searching for another job: if workers are searching for
another job, it is reasonable to believe that the quality of their job match can be improved and
that they may regard the one of their actual employment as insufficient.
We use data from a Spanish survey launched in the year 1999. This survey is especially
designed to obtain a representative picture of people with disabilities in Spain, since it in-
cludes information on employment in a similar way as other labour force surveys do. The in-
formation included takes into account whether or not the current job has been obtained
through an employment promotion programme, and whether or not the individual has used
labour market intermediation services specifically designed for people with disabilities. As
will be explained later (see Section 3), an important feature in this survey is that disability is
not defined as «disability to work», but as «disability to day-to-day activities» —following
the recommendations of the World Health Organization; therefore, the self-justification bias
does not contaminate the results.
We estimate the impact of employment promotion measures on the quality of the job
match through non-experimental techniques (in particular, matching analysis). Our find-
ings show that neither employment promotion measures nor specialized labour market in-
termediation services have significant effects on the quality of the job match for disabled
workers.
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framework. The third section describes the data set and the main variables of the empirical
analysis, focusing on the definition of disability in the survey. The fourth section explains
the details of the evaluation methodology. The fifth section presents and discusses the empir-
ical results. The final section concludes.
2. Institutional background and hypotheses
2.1. Policies designed to promote the employment of people with disabilities
When considering hiring an individual with a disability, an employer might face a great
deal of uncertainty about assessing the candidate’s potential productivity, thereby increasing
the perceived risk associated with hiring the individual. Several factors can affect this level
of perceived risk, which can subsequently affect the hiring decision.
First, the employers’ level of knowledge regarding the impairment might play an impor-
tant role in assessing potential productivity. For instance, an employer with reasonably good
knowledge of the individual’s functional limitations because of his or her impairment and
how is likely to affect work performance given the requirements of the job, might be able to
make a more accurate assessment of an individual’s potential productivity. Employers with
less information are likely to make less accurate assessments.
Second, the degree to which the impairment is relevant to the work required can have a
significant effect on perceived risk. For instance, an employer considering hiring as a
telemarketer an individual who uses a wheelchair might expect the impairment to have no ef-
fect on job performance. However, the same employer looking to hire an individual suffering
from chronic pain, might anticipate that the candidate will require frequent breaks and proba-
bly experience high absenteeism.
Given the potential uncertainty that employers might face in considering whether or not
to hire persons with disabilities, employment promotion measures may improve the latter’s
likelihood of exiting from unemployment 1. This result might be attained due to the lower
costs of hiring disabled workers with special contracts —associated to lower social security
contributions— and, in general, due to lower non-wage costs of those newly hired workers.
These financial incentives can be obtained by employers from the Spanish Public Adminis-
tration as long as the worker hired is in possession of a disability certification, which is pro-
vided case-by-case by public health authorities under well-established medical protocols 2,
and if the individual is registered as a disabled job seeker at the Public Employment Office.
That is, employment promotion programs and specialized intermediaries give employers to-
tal freedom for selecting potential applicants into employment if the latter are in possession
of a disability certification, and applicants themselves are unlikely to have a considerable de-
gree of influence in the selection into the available program. Thus, in order to evaluate these
measures, it is important to dispose of variables related to characteristics on which employ-
ers may base their decision of selecting workers with disabilities 3.
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der in the «queue» of unemployment by giving them a sort of preference over non-disabled
unemployed individuals. This is the case of a quota system, whereby a percentage of the new
vacancies is reserved for people with disabilities 4. Its rationale lies on the fact that preju-
dices or lack of information might prevent firms from hiring disabled individuals, even
though they might have the same productivity as the remainder of workers. A similar ratio-
nale underlies the functioning of intermediation services designed for disabled individuals:
they may cause an improvement in their entry (or re-entry) into the labour market. Since
these intermediation services increase the information available for both firms and workers,
the unemployment level related to the mismatch will presumably be lower. International evi-
dence also shows that assistance with job search and placement planning (i.e., specialized la-
bour market intermediation) is effective in improving placement rates and placement out-
comes (Corden and Thornton, 2002). In addition, they can reduce the problems related to the
existence of asymmetric information which are relevant for parties to any labour contract (as
explained above) 5. Finally, the promotion of sheltered employment centres — or centros
especiales de empleo, which workforce has to be integrated, at least, by 70% of workers with
disabilities in order to obtain the corresponding financial incentives— pretends to increase
individuals’ likelihood of moving into employment, as they give preference to the hiring of
disabled persons 6.
2.2. Hypotheses: the quality of the job match
The hypothesis in this paper is that the aforementioned policies may have impacts which
go beyond any improvement in the likelihood of exiting from unemployment. Indeed, it is
likely that these policies help enhance the quality of the job match for people with disabili-
ties. This is important to the extent that equally qualified persons without disabilities will be
substitutes for those with disabilities, and —all else being equal— when available, the for-
mer will be preferred to the latter in hiring situations where employers perceive great uncer-
tainty about the productivity of individuals with disabilities. The implication is that the de-
mand for the labour of people with disabilities will be greater when substitute labour is
scarce (during an economic boom) and lower when substitute labour is in abundance (during
a recession). Put another way, people with disabilities might be among the last hired and first
fired over the ups and downs of the business cycle. Therefore, in this setting, if these policies
increase the individuals’ likelihood of attaining a permanent contract or reduce their likeli-
hood of searching for another job, we would observe some lengthening in the duration of the
underlying labour relationship (i.e., an enhanced stability in their careers). On the contrary, if
these policies had a negative effect on the quality of the job match, then labour market inte-
gration of disabled individuals would be worsened.
There are many previous works (almost all of them influenced by Jovanovic, 1979)
which model the labour market as different processes of job matching between jobs and
workers. In spite of the fact that most of these optimal job matching models focus on the in-
dividual job search and are very abstract, they provide a theoretical framework which is use-
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quality of their job match. In this sense, in the search for employment, people with disabili-
ties are likely to face higher costs than persons without disabilities, which might decrease the
likelihood that a disabled individual will be matched with an appropriate job, and might also
reduce the likelihood that the individual will enter the labour market 7.
We put forward the following hypotheses regarding the relationship between employ-
ment promotion measures and the quality of the job match. Firstly, measures which consist
of reductions in hiring costs —reduction in non-wage costs, lower social security contribu-
tions, etc.— might have a two-fold impact on the quality of the job match. On the one hand,
if there is a problem of prejudices or lack of information, this financial incentive might en-
courage firms to hire those disabled individuals who are as productive as non-disabled ones,
and, therefore, would provide them with a match of higher quality. On the other hand, the fi-
nancial incentive might even promote the hiring of those disabled individuals who are less
productive than non-disabled ones, in view of the compensation which underlies the finan-
cial incentive of the contract. Presumably, in this latter case, those individuals with a poorer
match will be among the first fired during economic crises.
Secondly, measures related to protected employment (as, for instance, quota systems)
may have a significant effect on the quality of the job match in as much as they imply reduc-
tions in the amount of workers available for some jobs. Under a quota system, the firm needs
to fill a vacancy by considering only a subgroup of the labour force (i.e., disabled individu-
als). Even taking into account the fact that these individuals might be negatively affected by
discrimination based on prejudices or lack of information, reaching the same quality for the
job match at a low cost of candidates’ selection will presumably be more difficult. As a re-
sult, these measures will be likely to exert a negative impact on the quality of the job match.
A similar problem arises with sheltered employment centres, but, in this case even more pro-
nounced, given that a determined proportion of the staff needs to be selected among disabled
individuals. Thus, the average productivity of these establishments is expected to be lower. If
they are not protected from competition in the markets of goods and services their survival as
productive organizations is likely to be threatened. On the contrary, if they are protected
from the free market, then they are likely to become an end for disabled individuals’ labour
careers 8.
Finally, specialized labour market intermediation for disabled individuals might im-
prove the quality of the match. The reason being that this type of intermediation provides ex-
pertise and information for both firms and workers, thereby, decreasing unemployment and
the duration of vacancies related to the mismatch.
In summary, different effects are to be expected from those policies, to the extent that
some of them may have, at the same time, positive and negative impacts on the quality of the
job match. Therefore, only an empirical analysis will offer useful information to disentangle
the likely impact of policies addressed to disabled individuals on their job match.
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The database used in this article is the Survey on Impairments, Disabilities and Health
Status (Encuesta sobre Deficiencias, Discapacidades y Estado de Salud, EDDES) launched
in 1999. This survey was designed to obtain representative data on the incidence of disabili-
ties in the Spanish population. For this purpose, the sample size was increased up to 79,000
households (around 250,000 individuals) 9. Employment information was obtained (when
possible) following the methodology of the Spanish Labour Force Survey. Information on
the use of the different measures of employment promotion was obtained through direct
questions on disabled individuals’ current job.
An important characteristic of the survey is its definition of disability. This definition
follows the recommendations of the World Health Organization, which defines the term
«disability» as a consequence of impairments on an individual’s activity. This means that
disabilities are related to the individual, while impairments are related to problems of organs
or biological systems of the body. In fact, sometimes impairments are compensated by the
reception of technical help, so that they do not eventually lead to a disability 10. Therefore,
the information provided by the EDDES-1999 is comparable to other surveys which follow
the international definitions of the World Health Organization.
In addition, this definition of disability eludes the self-justification bias, since people can
not classify themselves as disabled to work. That is, instead of asking whether the individual
is disabled to work, information on disability is attained through questions on different as-
pects of the individual’s day-to-day activities. In particular, the questionnaire asks for some
daily activities included in a closed list of items, and whether or not the individual is limited
to perform such activities 11. There are 36 activities integrated in the following groups: see-
ing, hearing, communicating, learning and application of knowledge, moving inside the
household, using arms and legs, moving outside the household, caring for himself/herself,
doing housework, and capability to establish relationships with other people. Therefore, the
answer to any of these questions is not necessarily related to disability to work. This avoids
the endogeneity bias of other surveys —such as, for instance, the Health and Retirement Sur-
vey of the United States 12.
An additional advantage of using the EDDES-1999 is that its definition of disability
does not include chronic illness. This distinction is important to the extent that the effects
arising from chronic illness and the ones arising from disability may be different. For exam-
ple, an individual who suffers from diabetes might develop a severe eyesight problem related
to this chronic illness, but many other diabetic individuals may well not suffer such a type of
disability. Therefore, a blind’s relationship with the labour market as a consequence of dia-
betes will be very similar to the experience of other people who became blind due to other
reasons, and substantially different from other diabetic individuals who are not blind 13.
To sum up, the EDDES-1999 database provides reliable information on employment
promotion measures for people with disabilities, and its definition of disability is free from
the most common problems associated in the current literature with disability.
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the empirical analysis 14. First of all, the prevalence ratio of disability in Spain is 5 per cent
for working age and its distribution by gender is almost fifty-fifty. Its presence, however, is
higher for women when people above 65 years-old are included (Malo, 2003). As usual, it
increases with age, although in Southern European countries the relative importance among
the 55-65 year-old interval is substantially higher than in the remainder of EU-15 countries
(Malo and García-Serrano, 2001).
In addition, the participation rate of disabled individuals is much lower than for non-dis-
abled ones. In 1999, such a rate was 32 per cent in Spain, while it raised up to 50 per cent for
total working-age population; for such a year, the employment rate was 24 and 42 per cent,
respectively (Malo, 2003). However, the unemployment rate was much higher for the former
(26 per cent) than for the latter (16 per cent). Table 1 shows that, as expected, inactivity in-
creases with the number of disabilities, while the opposite is true for employment.
Table A.6 shows the description of the main variables of the empirical analysis. Our
dataset contains 975 individuals (all of whom are wage and salary workers). As regards the
proxies for the quality of the job match, there do not exist significant differences between
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Table 1: Participation in the labour market and number of disabilities
1 2 3 4 or more Total
Employment 38.44 30.64 23.92 12.16 23.52
Unemployment 9.95 8.50 9.34 5.19 7.47
Inactivity 51.61 60.86 66.74 82.65 69.01
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: EDDES-1999 and authors’ calculations.
Table 2: Distribution of treatment status by the quality of the job match (type of contract and
searching for another job) and distribution of the quality of the job match by treatment status
Type of contract Treated Controls Total Treated Controls Total
Temporary 22.99 77.01 100.00 33.33 26.84 28.10
Open-ended 17.97 82.03 100.00 66.67 73.16 71.90
Total 19.83 80.62 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Searching for another job Treated Controls Total Treated Controls Total
Yes 24.07 75.93 100.00 6.88 5.22 5.54
No 19.11 80.89 100.00 93.12 94.78 94.46
Total 19.38 80.62 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: EDDES-1999 and authors’ calculations.treated and controls: 73% of controls and 67% of treated are enjoying open-ended contracts,
and 5% of controls and 7% of treated are searching for another job. There exists a relatively
low rate of use of employment promotion measures: from 1 to 5 per cent. We have defined a
dummy indicating the beneficiary status of any of such measures, which shows that almost
one fifth (18 per cent) have passed through any employment promotion program, while 9
percent have used intermediation services in order to get employment. The proxies for the
quality of the job match show that 72 per cent of individuals enjoy an open-ended contract,
while 6 per cent are searching for another job. Therefore, there is a clear difference between
the demand-side and the supply-side evaluation of the matching quality: the subjective (or
supply-side) evaluation is better than the objective (or demand-side) one.
Table 2 shows the distribution of beneficiary status by the quality of the job match (type
of contract held and whether or not the individual is searching for another job) and the distri-
bution of the quality of the job match by treatment status. Approximately, 77 per cent of dis-
abled individuals with a temporary contract are in the non-beneficiary category (i.e., they are
neither addressing to specialized intermediaries nor are recipients of any employment pro-
motion measure). This percentage rises up to approximately 82 per cent among disabled in-
dividuals holding open-ended contracts. Being beneficiary of either promotion measures or
of specialized intermediation is slightly larger among individuals holding temporary con-
tracts (80.89 versus 75.93). In addition, among treated individuals, two thirds are holding an
open-ended contract, and most of them (93.12%) are not searching for another job. Among
controls, those figures do not substantially vary: only 26.84% are holding temporary con-
tracts, while 94.78% are not searching for another job.
To sum up, this descriptive approach shows a relative low use of employment promotion
measures for people with disabilities, and there seems to be only slight differences in the
proxies of the quality of the job match.
4. Evaluation methodology
4.1. The evaluation problem and non-experimental evaluation techniques
The main purpose of this paper is to assess the impact of employment promotion mea-
sures on the quality of the jobs found by disabled people 15. Assuming that measure recipi-
ents were a random sample of all those eligible, a valid approach to estimate the effect of
such measures would be to compare the outcome of the former with those of non-recipients.
However, where administrators (or firms) are discriminating between the less and better able
as a basis for measure selection, this process would bias estimates of their potential effects if
it is unobserved by the evaluator. For instance, if firms are taking the best for the measures
(i.e., they are «cream-skimming») measure effects would be over-estimated; similarly, mea-
sure effects may be underestimated if firms were targeting resources on the least able. In
other words, the effect of employment promotion measures can be characterized by two dis-
tinct processes: on the one hand, being recipient of the measure; on the other hand, the pro-
cess determining the outcome (i.e., job quality). The question of selection bias arises when
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the relationship between the two processes can be fully accounted for by observable charac-
teristics, selection bias will simply be avoided by including the relevant variables in the
equation explaining outcomes. However, if unobservable characteristics affecting participa-
tion can also influence outcomes, controlling for differences in observable characteristics
does nothing to address the issue of sample selection and, therefore, the estimated treatment
effect will be biased. This is the essence of the selection problem.
In order to assess the effects of employment promotion measures on a recipient individ-
ual, one must compare the observed outcome —i.e., the factual outcome— with the outcome
that would have resulted had that person not been recipient of the measure —i.e., the
so-called counterfactual outcome. However, only the former is actually observed, and this is
the reason for the evaluation problem, which, in essence, is one of missing data. To over-
come this problem, all approaches to evaluation attempt to provide an estimate of the
counterfactual in order to identify measure effects. There are two questions which evalua-
tions might wish to address. The first is what impact programme participation would have on
an individual drawn randomly from the population —the average treatment effect (ATE).
The second is what impact participation has on individuals who actually participated —the
average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT). These two effects are identical if we as-
sume homogeneous responses. However, where we allow for the more realistic scenario of
responses varying across individuals, the measures can likewise differ. Both estimates are of
interest. While ATT indicates the average benefit of participation, ATE would be relevant
when the policy interest is focused on making a voluntary programme compulsory, for ex-
ample (see Bryson et al., 2002).
Several alternative approaches exists that take explicit account of the selection issue.
These can be grouped under the broad headings of experimental and non-experimental ap-
proaches 16. The non-experimental techniques share one thing in common: in the absence of
an observable counterfactual, assumptions have to be made to identify the causal effect of a
policy or programme on the outcome of interest. There are broadly two main categories of
non-experimental methods: before-after estimators and cross-section estimators (Heckman
and Smith, 1999). The former have been widely used in evaluations, but require longitudinal
or repeat cross-section data, which may not be often available 17 (as it occurs in our case).
Our dataset is suitable for cross section estimators, which use non-participants to derive the
counterfactual for participants. The method of matching constitutes one way of doing this,
along with instrumental variables technique (IV) and the Heckman selection estimator 18.
The general matching method is a non-parametric approach to the problem of identifying the
treatment impact on outcomes. It consists of contrasting the outcome of measure recipients
with the outcomes of «comparable» non-recipients —i.e., individuals sharing similar charac-
teristics. It assumes that selection can be explained purely in terms of observable characteris-
tics, since the choice of the match is dictated by observable characteristics.
Although the technique was developed in the 1980s (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983) and
has its roots in a conceptual framework which dates back even further (Rubin, 1974), its use
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ticular prominence following the work of Dehejia and Wahba (1998, 1999) who, in
reanalysing a sub-set of the data used in LaLonde’s (1986) seminal work —which had estab-
lished the superiority of experimental estimators— indicated that propensity score matching
performed extremely well 19. As we shall see, the method has an intuitive appeal arising
from the way it mimics random assignment through the construction of a control group post
hoc.
The parameter of interest can be formally described as follows. For any disabled individ-
ual, define random variables representing the job quality the individual would have attained
had he been a recipient of employment promotion measures, and the job quality the individ-
ual would have attained had he not. Denote these two potential outcomes by Y1 and Y0, and
denote employment promotion measure recipient status by a dummy variable, D. For each
individual, we observe only Y = Y0 +( Y1 – Y0)D,s oY0 is not observed for measure recipients,
and Y1 is not observed for non-measure recipients. We might nevertheless still hope to iden-
tify certain averages of Y1 – Y0. The effect of treatment on the treated (Rubin, 1977) is one
such parameter:
EY Y D EY D EY D [| ] [ | ] [ | ] 10 1 0 111      (1)
This tells us whether, on average, programme recipients benefited or suffered from par-
ticipation in the employment promotion programme.
Simple comparisons by programme recipient status can be used to estimate EY Y D [| ] 10 1  .
However, such comparisons do not control for most of the criteria used by employers to
choose which disabled persons to accept. The job quality of non-accepted disabled individu-
als might therefore provide a poor indicator of what measure recipients would have achieved
if they had not enjoyed any employment promotion measure. To explore this point further,
note that the comparison by employment promotion measure recipient status can be decom-
posed as follows:
EY D EY D EY Y D EY D EY D [ | ][ | ][ | ] { [ | ][ | 10 1 0 00 10 1 1        0]} (2)
This shows that comparison of job quality by beneficiary status is equal to
EY Y D [| ] 10 1  plus a bias term attributable to the fact that job quality of non-recipients is
not necessarily representative of what recipients would have enjoyed had they not passed
through any employment promotion measure. That is, since measure beneficiary choices are
likely to be the result of systematic decisions, the sample of individuals who are assigned to
an employment promotion measure will not be random. If this is ignored and individuals
who pass through employment measures are simply compared with those who did not, the
estimates will suffer from bias 20.
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The matching method attempts to mimic ex post an experiment by choosing a compari-
son group from among the non-treated individuals such that they are as similar as possible to
the treatment group in terms of their observable characteristics. All the outcome-relevant dif-
ferences between treated and non-treated individuals are captured in their observable attrib-
utes, the only remaining difference between the two groups being their treatment status. In
this case, the average outcome of the matched non-treated individuals constitutes the correct
sample counterpart for the missing information on the outcomes the treated would have ex-
perienced, on average, had they not been treated.
This way of overcoming the missing counterfactual rests on the so-called conditional in-
dependence assumption (CIA) between non-treatment variables and the programme partici-
pation status D. This implies that if one can control for observable differences in characteris-
tics between the treated and non-treated group, the outcome that would result in the absence
of treatment is the same in both cases. It allows the counterfactual outcome for the treatment
group to be inferred, and therefore, for any differences between the treated and non-treated
to be attributed to the effect of the programme:
YY DX 10 ,|  (3)
This assumption of selection on observables requires that, conditional on an appropriate
set of observed attributes, the distribution of the (counterfactual) outcome Y0 in the treated
group is the same as the (observed) distribution of Y0 in the non-treated group. Therefore, if
the conditional independence assumption holds, the matching process is analogous to creat-
ing an experimental dataset in that, conditional on observed characteristics, the selection pro-
cess is random. Consequently, the distribution of the counterfactual outcome for the treated
is the same as the observed outcomes for the non-treated.
However, when a wide range of X variables is in use, finding exact matches can be ex-
tremely difficult. This obstacle was overcome thanks to an important result showing that
matching on a single index reflecting the probability of participation could achieve consis-
tent estimates of the treatment effect in the same way as matching on all covariates. Follow-
ing Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) 21, distance can be measured in terms of a balancing score
q(X), defined as a function of the observables such that XD q X  |() . One of such balancing
scores is the propensity score, p(X), the probability to receive treatment given the set of
pre-treatment characteristics:
pX D X ED X ()P r ( |) (|)  1 (4)
As Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) show, by definition, treatment and non-treatment ob-
servations with the same value of the propensity score have the same distribution of the full
vector of regressors X independently of the treatment status. In other words, for a given pro-
pensity score, exposure to treatment is random and therefore, treated and control units should
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lity problem to a one-dimensional one: the estimation of the mean outcome in the non-trea-
ted group is a function of the propensity score.
However, this problem of reduced chances of finding a match does not disappear en-
tirely with propensity score matching. It is still possible that there will be nobody in the
non-treatment group with a propensity score that is «similar» to that of a particular treat-
ment group individual. This is known as the «support» problem. In order to overcome it,
one has to identify participants who are poorly matched and then omit them from the esti-
mation of treatment effects, so that any combination of characteristics seen among those in
the treatment group may also be observed among those in the non-treatment group. That is,
when there is no support for the treated individual in the non-treated population, this
treated individual is dropped from the analysis. The estimated treatment effect has then to
be redefined as the mean treatment effect for those treated falling within the common sup-
port.
The explicit acknowledgement of the common support problem is one of the main fea-
tures distinguishing matching methods from standard parametric regressions. The other main
distinguishing feature is that matching is non-parametric. Consequently, it avoids the restric-
tions involved in models that require the relationship between characteristics and outcomes
to be specified.
5. Estimations
5.1. Estimating the propensity score: Can the CIA be justified in our case?
The effects of employment promotion measures refer in this paper to their impact on the
job quality of measure recipients through two distinct outcomes — (i) having a permanent
contract; (ii) searching for another job— relative to what would have happened to recipients
if they had not passed through the measure 22. Our dataset contains 975 individuals. Out of
these, 189 have passed either through any employment promotion program, or through spe-
cialized intermediation services. Although from the institutional point of view some differ-
ences exist among both groups of measures (see Section 2 above), we have treated both mea-
sures as if they were only one, since, in essence, the expected outcome from both types of
policies is the same.
Our propensity score model is fitted as a probit regression model where the dependent
variable indicates being recipient of any measure (either employment promotion or special-
ized intermediation services), and the independent variables are the factors thought to influ-
ence participation and outcome.
As stated in the previous section, the matching strategy builds on the Conditional Inde-
pendence Assumption (CIA), requiring that the outcome variable must be independent of
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observable characteristics and that all variables that influence treatment assignment and po-
tential outcomes simultaneously are observed by the researcher (Caliendo et al., 2005) 23.
Hence, implementing matching requires choosing a set of variables X that credibly satisfies
this condition. Therefore, one needs to first consider the mechanisms through which individ-
uals join in a programme and then to assess whether the available regressors capture all the
relevant factors affecting the participation decision and future potential outcomes 24. In addi-
tion, we must take into account that only variables that are unaffected by participation, or the
anticipation of participation, should be included. To do otherwise would be to mask possibly
important programme effects, undermining the interpretability of estimated effects (see
Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999).
As regards selection of disabled individuals into employment promotion measures and
of specialized intermediaries, both are likely to be a result from employers’ decisions, as ap-
plicants themselves are unlikely to have a relevant degree of influence in the selection into
the available program (as was explained earlier in Section 2.1). Fortunately, our dataset of-
fers sufficiently rich information on pre-measure variables, which are likely to be important
predictors of measure beneficiary and outcomes. The value of these variables is that they
contain pre-measure information which may be critical in estimating measure beneficiary
status and post-measure outcomes. Moreover, they may help capture otherwise unobservable
characteristics —such as motivation— which might also influence participation and out-
comes. To capture selection by employers, educational qualifications and, in particular, ap-
plicant’s health status is crucial, in that it affects candidate’s potential productivity at a given
time and future labour market outcomes. Health variables measured before beneficiary status
are divided in the following groups:
 The type of disability suffered by the individual (eyesight, hearing, language, under-
standing, travelling, physiological needs, not capable to do the housework or relation-
ship difficulties)
 Whether the individual suffering any of such disabilities receives help (either techni-
cal or personal help)
 Whether the disability’s degree of severity is slight or moderate (very severe will be
the reference category)
 Age at the date of disability diagnosis
 Whether or not the individual suffers only one disability
 Whether or not he/she has a certificate of disability
 Whether or not he/she receives any sort of financial subsidy or benefit
 Whether or not he/she belongs to a non-profit organization for disabled people
Similarly, factors related to potential returns from participation (e.g., age, previous
stock of human capital in terms of level of education) have also been included in the condi-
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ployment outcomes we have also included the following ones: civil status, whether or not
the individual is the main person in the household, household size and the region of resi-
dence. The aforementioned variables are either fixed over time (e.g., gender) or were col-
lected at the date of eligibility and, as such are unaffected by measure beneficiary 25. Thus,
the empirical analysis includes many of the variables we would expect to influence partici-
pation and labour market outcomes for the two groups of individuals, since rich data were
available from the survey. This allows us to credibly justify the CIA and the matching pro-
cedure (Table 3).
As shown in Table 4, the propensity to be recipient of employment promotion mea-
sures or specialized intermediation services is higher than average if disabled individuals
are in possession of a certificate of disability, if they are men, if they receive financial sub-
sidies or benefits, if they belong to a non-profit organization for disabled people or if they
have followed vocational training courses. In addition, the type of disability becomes a key
determinant of measure beneficiary, in the sense that those with hearing disability receiv-
ing help are more likely to become measure recipients, as well as those who suffer from
understanding disability (to a slight or moderate degree), and from travelling or under-
standing disability diagnosed before the age of sixteen. On the contrary, those with college
degree and those who suffer from hearing disability, eyesight disability (to a slight or mod-
erate degree) or from disability to undertake housework which was diagnosed before the
age of sixteen are less likely to benefit from either employment promotion measures or
specialized intermediation.
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Table 3: Data used to generate propensity scores
Demographic Household
— gender — head of household
— age — household size
— civil status
— region of residence
Qualifications Health status
— followed training courses — financial subsidies/benefits
— level of education — number of disabilities
— age of disability diagnosis
— type of disability
— reception of help
— disability’s degree of severity
— possession of disability certificate
— belongs to a non-profit organization for disabled peopleEmployment promotion measures and the quality of the job match for persons with disabilities 93




Only one disability –0,127 –0,730
Disability certificate 1,076 6,850
Gender (1=Men) 0,460 2,760
Age –0,045 –1,070
Age squared 0,000 0,570
Marital status (1=married) –0,260 –1,440
Head of the household (1=Yes) 0,081 0,450
Household size 0,016 0,310
Financial subsidies or benefits (1=Yes) 0,308 2,040
Belongs to a non-profit organization for disabled people 0,751 4,270
Has followed vocational training courses 0,348 2,070
Illiterate or without studies – –
Primary studies 0,177 0,810
Middle school –0,172 –0,560
Vocational training –0,211 –0,650
College degree –0,564 –1,900
Eyesight disability – –
Hearing disability –0,804 –2,160
Language disability 0,473 1,260
Understanding disability –0,993 –1,010
Travelling disability 0,303 1,190
Physiological needs disability –0,184 –0,190
Disability to undertake housework 0,469 1,190
Relationship disability –0,894 –1,200
Eyesight disability & receives help 0,351 1,130
Hearing disability & receives help 0,803 2,640
Language disability & receives help 0,429 0,590
Understanding disability & receives help 1,073 1,100
Travelling disability & receives help 0,135 0,720
Physiological needs disability & receives help 0,204 0,240
Disability to undertake housework & receives help –0,153 –0,450
Relationship disability & receives help –1,567 –1,280
Eyesight disability & slight or moderate severity –0,585 –2,120
Hearing disability & slight or moderate severity 0,510 1,480
Language disability & slight or moderate severity –0,253 –0,430
Understanding disability & slight or moderate severity 1,261 2,030
Travelling disability & slight or moderate severity –0,065 –0,350
Physiological needs disability & slight or moderate severity –0,205 –0,300
Disability to undertake housework & slight or moderate severity 0,438 1,420
Relationship disability & slight or moderate severity 1,187 1,610
Eyesight disability & under 16 0,328 1,390
Hearing disability & under 16 0,201 0,680
Language disability & under 16 –0,452 –0,920
Understanding disability & under 16 1,822 1,950
Travelling disability & under 16 0,361 1,820
Physiological needs disability & under 16 0,392 0,650
Disability to undertake housework & under 16 –0,867 –2,350
Relationship disability & under 16 –0,343 –0,390
Region: South 0,003 0,020
Region: East Coast –0,100 –0,550
Region: North Coast –0,197 –0,930
Region: Ebro River 0,203 0,710
Region: Centre (Castilla and Madrid) – –




Prob>chi2 0.00005.2. Implementing propensity score matching estimators
An estimate of the propensity score is not enough to estimate the average treatment on
the treated (ATT) of interest, given that the probability of observing two units with exactly
the same value of the propensity score is in principle zero, since p(X) is a continuous variable
(see equation [4] above). Various methods have been proposed in the literature to identify
the comparison group through propensity score matching. Those methods reach different
points on the frontier of the trade-off between quality and quantity of the matches and none
of them is a priori superior to the others. Thus, their joint consideration in our empirical anal-
ysis offers a way to assess the robustness of the estimates. We have used the publicly avail-
able Stata command developed by Leuven and Sianesi (2003) that performs the types of pro-
pensity score matching presented in this section. Table 5 shows estimated ATT and ATE,
where the treatment refers to either being recipient of any employment promotion measures
or of specialized intermediation services. We have imposed with all these methods the com-
mon support restriction. This way, we ensure that any combination of characteristics seen
among those in the treatment group may also be observed among those in the non-treatment
group (as commented on above) 26.
The traditional and most intuitive form of matching is nearest-neighbour (or one-to-one)
matching, which takes each treated unit and searches for the control unit with the closest pro-
pensity score. The resulting set of non-treatment individuals constitutes the comparison
group. Although it is not necessary, the method is usually applied with replacement, in the
sense that a control unit can be a best match for more than one treated unit. Matching with re-
placement in this way is less demanding in terms of the support requirement since individu-
als in the comparison group who would provide the closest match to a number of treated in-
dividuals remain available 27. Once each treated unit is matched with a control unit, the
difference between the outcome of the treated units and the outcome of the matched control
units is computed. The ATT of interest is then obtained by averaging these differences. Esti-
mated nearest-neighbour treatment effects (ATT) for employment promotion measure bene-
ficiary (Table 5) show a negative effect for the outcome of reaching a permanent contract,
and a positive effect for the outcome of searching for another job. However, none of these ef-
fects is statistically significant.
Some of the matches found through nearest-neighbour might be fairly poor because for
some treated units the nearest neighbour may have a very different propensity score and nev-
ertheless he would contribute to the estimation of the treatment effect independently of this
difference. The radius and kernel matching methods offer a solution to this problem. With
radius matching, each treated unit is matched only with the control units whose propensity
score falls in a predefined neighbourhood of the propensity score of the treated unit. If the di-
mension of the neighbourhood (i.e., the radius) is set to be very small, it is possible that some
treated units are not matched because the neighbourhood does not contain control units. That
is, the smaller the radius, the more difficult it is to find a match within that range, resulting in
a greater number of cases failing the support requirement. On the other hand, the smaller the
size of the neighbourhood, the better is the quality of the matches. Results, therefore, may be
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Table 5: Average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and average treatment effect (ATE).
The treatment refers to either having been recipient of any employment promotion
measures or having access to employment through specialized intermediation services
for disabled people
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Note: The entries in brackets are the bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications).sensitive to the size of the radius that is the basis for matching. We tested the sensitivity of
our results to three radii: 0.005, 0.01 and 0.02.
In kernel-based matching, all treated are matched with a weighted average of all controls
with weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between the propensity scores of
treated and controls. The «kernel» is a function that weighs the contribution of each compari-
son group member, so that more importance is attached to those matched control units pro-
viding a better match. The most common approach is to use the normal distribution (with a
mean of zero) as a kernel, where the weight attached to a particular comparator is propor-
tional to the frequency of the distribution for the difference in scores observed. This means
that exact matches get a large weight, and poor matches get a small weight.
As regards the likelihood of attaining a permanent contract (see Table 5), radius match-
ing offers an estimated negative ATT. Once again, neither the estimated results with radius
matching nor with kernel matching are statistically significant.
Note also that in Table 5 the estimated ATE is never significant, implying that a disabled in-
dividual randomly chosen from the population and who passed through any employment promo-
tion measure would not achieve a significantly different job matching quality compared to the
hypothetical situation where he/she would not have been beneficiary of any of such measures.
Thus, as a summary, the propensity score evaluation indicates that participation in employ-
ment promotion measures or in specialized intermediation has no significant effect on the quality
of the job match. A larger likelihood of searching for another job (implying lower satisfaction
with actual employment) —a result which was apparent in the raw data of descriptive results (see
Section 3 above)— is no longer apparent once participation in these policies are compared with
«like» non-participants. Thus, differences in outcomes between the two groups (if any) are attrib-
utable to comparative advantages that are independent of the employment promotion measures.
Similarly, specialized intermediation presents a non-significant impact both on the probability of
finding a permanent job and on the probability of searching for another job.
A possible interpretation of these results is that disabled workers who are beneficiaries
of employment promotion measures or specialized labour market intermediation will enjoy a
similar quality in their job matches as other disabled workers do. Therefore, these active la-
bour market policies will have neither an adverse effect on separation probabilities under an
economic crisis nor a positive effect. It is important to remark that our results have no impli-
cations regarding the quality of the job match of disabled workers compared to the average
quality of the job match of non-disabled workers 28. Finally, if we regard having an
open-ended contract and not searching for another job as signals of a long-term attachment
to the labour market, we must conclude that these policies do not improve disabled individu-
als’ long-term attachment to the labour market.
5.3. Assessment of matching quality
The final step in applying matching should be to test the resulting matching quality in
terms of covariate balance in the matched groups. To be effective, matching should balance
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be calculated for each characteristic in order to achieve a standardised indicator of the degree
to which the matching has been successful in balancing (see, for example, Sianesi, 2001).
Table 6 provides some diagnostics on the performance of the match for employment
promotion measures and specialized intermediation. Each cell represents the percent reduc-
tion in the bias (between members of the treatment group and those of the comparison group)
for significant covariates used to model treatment status. The bias is the difference of the
sample means in the treated and non-treated (full or matched) sub-samples as a percentage of
the square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups
(formulae from Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). Ideally, one would have a 100 percent reduc-
tion in every significant covariate. As can be observed, while in Table 6, the bias is not re-
duced for the covariate «Hearing disability and receives help» (the corresponding cell fig-
ures are negative). In addition, note also that reduction in covariate imbalance is not
especially high in some variables for the nearest-neighbour technique (in fact, the nearest
method, as previously underlined, may at times turn out to be quite apart). Therefore, we can
conclude that matching quality is better for Epanechnikov, Gaussian and Biweight kernel. In
addition, the results have shown that the model of measure participation appears plausible
and includes a number of significant variables in all cases. This, together with the rich vari-
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Table 6: Percent reduction in covariate imbalance after propensity score matching
for employment promotion measures and intermediation services
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Disability certificate 95.6 98.7 99.4 99.4 99.4 96.1 99.5 99.1
Gender (1=Men) 54.4 79.5 88.2 84.4 90.2 88.0 87.1 94.4
Financial subsidies or benefits (1=Yes) 81.1 98.5 85 86.6 88.7 91.6 88.6 88.3
Belongs to a non-profit organization for disabled people 98.3 89.9 96 98.4 96.4 94.6 96.1 97.2
Has followed vocational training courses 62.3 82.3 86.6 94.5 91.5 85.9 92.1 88.4
College degree 91.9 86.3 94.6 87 85.8 90.0 84.1 90.1
Hearing disability 90.6 95.9 93.3 91.6 94.0 92.1 94.8 92.4
Hearing disability & receives help –1150.8 –1320.1 –853 –300 –302.3 –275.1 –375.3 –165.2
Eyesight disability & slight or moderate severity 71 65.9 83.9 82.2 81.3 81.4 81.8 69.7
Understanding disability & slight or moderate severity 93.3 90.9 99.4 97.6 96.4 92.7 96.0 92.4
Understanding disability & under 16 95.2 92.7 91.2 94.8 94.4 94.8 93.7 96.4
Travelling disability & under 16 100 98.6 94.6 97.3 96.1 97.1 96.3 95.3
Disability to undertake housework & under 16 91 90.4 97.9 94.9 96.9 97.9 97.1 97.6
Notes: This table shows the convergence of mean values on key variables in the propensity store equation, with
non/participant characteristics closely resembling those of participants alter matching. The bias is the difference of the
sample means in the treated and non-treated (full or matched) sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the
average of the sample variances in the treated and non-treated groups (formulae from Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985).
(1) Nearest-neighbour matching method with replacement & common support
(2) Radius matching with common support, caliper 0.005
(3) Radius matching with common support calliper 0.01




(8) Uniform kernelable set used in the modelling, provides some reassurance that the matching approach is suc-
cessfully controlling for those characteristics that might be expected to result in differences
in outcomes between participants and non-participants.
5.4. Results for disaggregate groups: Heterogeneity effects
At no stage of the evaluation procedure it was assumed that the causal effects of partici-
pating in employment promotion measures of specialized intermediation needs to be individ-
ually homogeneous. In fact, it is one of the advantages of matching that the assumption of
homogeneity of effects is not necessary. If the individual effects are heterogeneous —which
is possible given different personalities, employment initial conditions, regions, etc.— the
causal effect in the groups of participants will not be estimated accurately.
The mean causal effects have been estimated for various sub-samples of disabled indi-
viduals and their matched pairs in order to analyse the heterogeneity issues. The following
groups are considered (Table A.1-A.5): individuals who pass through employment promo-
tion measures, men, individuals below 53 years-old, individuals without certificate of dis-
ability and those suffering more than one disability. The estimation steps applied in section
5.2. have been applied for every sub-sample under consideration. As can be observed in the
appendix, for no sub-group we find causal effects to be statistical significant. Therefore, het-
erogeneity is not empirically relevant as regards the aforementioned variables when assess-
ing the impact of employment promotion measures and specialized labour market intermedi-
ation on the quality of disabled people job matches.
6. Conclusions
In this article we have analysed the effect of policies addressed to the employment pro-
motion of people with disabilities on the quality of their job match. This constitutes a novelty
in the literature, since previous research has mainly focused on the disincentive effects that
income transfers have on the activity of disabled individuals. Our analysis is directly related
to the attachment that people with disabilities have to the labour market. Those with a poor
match will presumably suffer a higher dismissal probability in an economic crisis, worsening
their welfare and creating disruptions in their labour career. Anyway, as Jovanovic (1979)
explains, the job is an experience good and when the quality of the job match is low the sepa-
ration probability (by either dismissal or quit) will increase. Therefore, it is crucial to assess
whether policy programmes intended to improve labour market participation of disabled
people inflict a positive or a negative effect (or any effect at all) on the quality of their job
match.
In addition, our empirical analysis uses a Spanish database which is especially launched
to have an accurate picture of people with disabilities and their relationship with the labour
market. Following the recommendations of the World Health Organization, this database
uses a definition of disability based on day-to-day activities (instead of disability to work),
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endogeneity bias29). Therefore, the data used are especially suitable for the objective of our
empirical analysis.
We have applied a non-experimental evaluation methodology: matching analysis. We
have used two variables as proxies for quality: the type of contract held and whether or not
the worker is searching another job. The former can be understood as a «demand-side» valu-
ation of the quality of the job match, because the type of contract is mainly (and usually) de-
cided by the firm and the worker either accepts or rejects it. The latter is a «supply-side» val-
uation, because for workers who are searching for another job, one can deduce that there is
not a perfect match between their current position and the one which would be optimal at
their current firm. Our main result is that policies promoting the employment of disabled in-
dividuals do not improve the quality of their job match (either valuated from the demand or
the supply side).
Policy implications from these results are neither pessimistic nor optimistic. The ana-
lyzed measures do not have positive effects on the quality of the job match and, therefore,
they are not stepping stones in the labour careers of workers with disabilities. The fact that
those measures do not increase the quality of the job match respect to workers who are not
beneficiaries of these measures is somewhat worrying. Particularly, in the case of specialized
labour market intermediation services, which not only should increase individuals’ probabil-
ity of participation in the labour market, but also the quality of their job match. It is likely
that employment promotion measures and intermediation services are mainly focused on
solving short-term problems related to job entry. Instead of this, they should adopt a wider
perspective in relation to the labour career prospects of workers.
In order for employment promotion measures to exert a positive impact on job quality,
one possibility would be to relate such measures with financial incentives for the perma-
nence of workers at their current employers. In the Spanish labour market, some efforts im-
plemented to provide financial support for permanent contracts go in this direction. In partic-
ular, financial incentives for conversions of temporary contracts into permanent ones are
presumably the most promising variant of this policy for disabled individuals.
On the other hand, specialized intermediation services should provide long-term advice
(instead of just helping workers to find a job). Our results suggest that a strategy based on
«any job is better than no job at all» is probably not always appropriate, since no positive im-
pacts are observed on the quality of the job match for people with disabilities. Thus, workers
with disabilities are being left aside in their traditional weak position in the Spanish labour
market. We are conscious of the fact that looking for exclusively «good» jobs is not the best
strategy either. That is, our recommendation is in line of making workers with disabilities to
obtain advice and intermediation as regards their labour careers as a whole (instead of only
focusing on their short-term gains in the labour market). For this purpose, financial incen-
tives should be based on a long-term perspective regarding the quality of their job match.
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1. In fact, employment promotion measures for disabled people can be considered as a particular case of active
labour market policies. For a more detailed analysis of those measures, the reader is referred to CES (2003),
Esteban (1999) or Romero (2003).
2. The certification is the official recognition as disabled and is only granted in case that the disability degree is
33 percent. On the other hand, being registered as a disabled job seeker is not a restricting condition: whenever
an employer finds a person with disabilities who is suitable to be hired, the latter can address any public em-
ployment office some previous days in order to get this requirement fulfilled.
3. As explained more thoroughly in Section 5.1 below, we use variables such as educational qualifications and, in
particular, applicant’s health status. Similarly, factors related to potential returns from participation (e.g., age,
previous stock of human capital in terms of level of education) will also be included in the conditioning set.
4. In particular, if the firm has more than 50 employees, it is compulsory to dedicate, at least, 2% of the vacancies
to disabled individuals.
5. It is important to remark that the quota system and the use of specialized intermediation services are fully
compatible with the use of labour contracts with a financial incentive. In fact, this will be the most common
case: when employers want to fulfil the quota for workers with disabilities, they will use these special con-
tracts in order to ask for public incentives.
6. The percentage of disability suffered by these workers must be 33 or higher.
7. Higher search costs might partly be related to the characteristics of the disability, which could make communi-
cating and interviewing with employers more expensive. In addition, an individual with a disability requiring
expensive care technologies has greater resource needs during the search process than a person without disabi-
lities who is otherwise identical. This might significantly reduce the amount of time that the individual is able
to search before accepting a job, resulting in a job of lower quality than the one of individuals who have
enough resources to search for a longer period (see Livermore et al., 2000).
8. As, in fact, they are not firms— they are unable to provide the experience required by «normal» firms. For the
Spanish case, Malo and Rodríguez (2000) find that sheltered employment centres are usually the end of the la-
bour careers of disabled individuals who are working there. There even exist incentives for sheltered employ-
ment centres in order not to promote the transition of their «best» workers towards «normal» firms, since these
centres’ average productivity would then be negatively affected.
9. A similar survey was launched in Spain in 1986. In spite of the fact that this previous survey was very useful to
obtain basic information on disabled individuals in Spain, its information on employment (and, in general, on
the labour market participation of people with disabilities) was rather limited. However, this experience was
useful to include a battery of questions related to employment and labour market in the EDDES-1999.
10. The most common example is that glasses compensate the impairment of myopia. Otherwise, myopia would
make more difficult the individual’s daily activity. In fact, as the case of glasses is an extended situation, they
are included in the survey only when the eyesight problems are very severe.
11. Therefore, this survey is based on subjective information about limitations to daily activities. This procedure is
commonly used in health and disability surveys to the whole population. Only when a health survey is focused
on a very specific group, medical and technical diagnosis can be used to evaluate how individuals are affected
by disabilities, chronic illnesses, syndromes, etc.
12. The question of the Health and Retirement Survey is the following: Do you have any impairment or health
problem that limits the amount of paid work you can do? If so, does this limitation keep you from working alto-
gether? Obviously, the results of any analysis on employment of disabled people will be heavily biased by the
use of this question in order to classify them as disabled or non-disabled. See, for instance, Benítez-Silva et al.
(2004) about how to deal with this bias created by the definition of disability as disability to work.
100 MIGUEL A. MALO AND FERNANDO MUÑOZ-BULLÓN13. This is particularly relevant in the special module on disability of the European Labour Force Survey, laun-
ched in 2002, where individuals are asked about disability and long-term health problems. Therefore, analyses
using the European Labour Force Survey will be different from those obtained from surveys using definitions
following WHO recommendations (as the Spanish EDDES-1999).
14. In addition, Table A.6. in the appendix shows means and standard deviations of the main variables.
15. As one analyst has recently noted: «The task of evaluation research lies in devising methods to reliably estima-
te [the impact of policy change], so that informed decisions about programme expansion and termination can
be made» (Smith, 2000:1).
16. To examine the rationale for field experimentation in economics, see Burtless, 1995.
17. For details, see Heckman and Smith (1999), and Blundell and MaCurdy (1999)
18. See Heckman, 1995, or Blundell and Costa Dias, 2000 for the IV estimator, and Goldberger (1983) or Puhani
(2000), for the Heckman selection estimator.
19. This work has been subsequently criticised in studies which show that propensity score matching, like other
non-experimental techniques, depend on assumptions about the nature of the process by which participants se-
lect into a programme, and the data available to the analyst (Smith and Todd, 2003; Heckman et al., 1998;
Agodini and Dynarski, 2001). Nevertheless, the technique continues to attract attention as a useful evaluation
tool in the absence of random assignment.
20. On the contrary, if employment promotion measure beneficiary status was randomly assigned, then D would
be independent of Y0 and Y1, implying EY D EY EY D EY [| ] [] , [| ] [ ] 00 1 1 1 01   and . In this case, the
effect of treatment on the treated is also the average treatment effect in the population subject to randomization
and can be estimated by simple comparisons.
21. Another unit-free metric, is the Mahalanobis one, which assigns weight to each coordinate of X in proportion
to the inverse variance of that coordinate (see Blundell et al. 2004). See, also, Abadie and Imbens, 2002, and
Zhao, 2004, for alternative matching metrics.
22. Our outcome variables are discrete in our application. Some research in the evaluation literature makes
special assumptions for the analysis of discrete data outcomes in models which analyse the distribution of
the treatment effect (and which control for selection on observable and unobservable characteristics). In
particular, it is assumed that a linear latent index generates the outcome (see, in this respect, Aakvik et. al,
2005).
23. If a variable influences only measure beneficiary status, there is no need to control for the differences between
the treatment and the comparison group since the outcome variable of interest is unaffected. Conversely, if a
variable influences only the outcome variable, there is no need to control for it since it will not be significantly
different between the treatment and comparison groups. In addition, should a variable thought to influence
outcomes perfectly predict participation, recipients would have a propensity score of 1 and non-recipients a
propensity score of 0. In these instances, it may be difficult to get an unbiased estimate of programme impact
using propensity score matching.
24. Where data do not contain all the variables influencing both participation and the outcome, CIA is viola-
ted, since programme effect will be accounted for in part by information which is not available to the eva-
luator.
25. For this reason, we have excluded one variable from the set of independent variables in the propensity
score estimations that, in spite of being available for our analysis, is likely to be affected by participation:
firm size. The fact that a disabled worker is benefited by some employment promotion measured is likely
to allow his contracting firm to hire more workers, given the savings that this hiring may imply for the
firm.
Employment promotion measures and the quality of the job match for persons with disabilities 10126. We are conscious of the fact that, doing this, high quality matches may be lost at the boundaries of the com-
mon support and the sample may be reduced (see Lechner, 2001). However, in our case, enforcement of the
common support does not result in a loss of a sizeable proportion of the treated population. The number of in-
dividuals rejected is only 41, except in radius matching with common support and calliper = 0.005, where it
accounts to 65.
27. Should a certain type of individual be common in the treatment group but relatively uncommon in the compa-
rison group, the pool of comparators able to provide a close match would become exhausted in case that mat-
ching were carried out without replacement. This is the reason why the technique is only implemented with re-
placement in our analysis.
28. Blázquez and Malo (2005) analyze the influence of being disabled on educational mismatch using Spanish
data of the ECHP and they conclude that disability has a non-significant impact on the mismatch.
29. See, for example, Benítez-Silva et al. (2004) for an extensive discussion about self-reported bias and endoge-
neity in disability research.
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Resumen
En este artículo se evalúa la influencia sobre la calidad del emparejamiento con el puesto de trabajo de las políticas
de promoción de empleo y de los servicios de intermediación laboral para personas con discapacidad. Para ello utili-
104 MIGUEL A. MALO AND FERNANDO MUÑOZ-BULLÓNzamos técnicas de análisis de matching. Nos centramos en dos aspectos de la calidad: el tipo de contrato (indefinido
o temporal) y si el el individuo busca o no empleo desde el empleo. Encontramos que los dos tipos de políticas no
mejorar la calidad del emparejamiento con el puesto. También se discuten las implicaciones de política laboral de los
resultados.
Palabras clave: Discapacidad, emparejamiento con el puesto, promoción de empleo, evaluación, análisis de mat-
ching, contrato indefinido, búsqueda de empleo desde el empleo.
Clasificación JEL: J480, J40, I120.
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APPENDIX
Table A.1: ATT and ATE for individuals who pass through employment promotion measures
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Note: The entries in brackets are the bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications).Employment promotion measures and the quality of the job match for persons with disabilities 107
Table A.2: ATT and ATE for men
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Note: The entries in brackets are the bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications)108 MIGUEL A. MALO AND FERNANDO MUÑOZ-BULLÓN
Table A.3: ATT and ATE for individuals under 53 years-old




Nearest-neighbour matching method with





































Nearest-neighbour matching method with



































Note: The entries in brackets are the bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications)Employment promotion measures and the quality of the job match for persons with disabilities 109
Table A.4: ATT and ATE for individuals without certificate of disability
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Note: The entries in brackets are the bootstrapped standard errors (500 replications)110 MIGUEL A. MALO AND FERNANDO MUÑOZ-BULLÓN
Table A.5: ATT and ATE for individuals suffering more than one disability
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Table A.6: Means and Standard Deviations in the sample of wage and salary workers
with disabilities
All Controls Treated
Variable Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean
Open-ended contract 975 0.72 786 0.73 189 0.67
Searching for another job 975 0.06 786 0.05 189 0.07
Only one disability 975 0.38 786 0.43 189 0.14
Official certificate of being disabled 975 0.33 786 0.21 189 0.82







Civil Status (1=Married) 975 0.63 786 0.69 189 0.39
Head of the household (1=Yes) 975 0.60 786 0.63 189 0.49
Household size 975 3.66 786 3.67 189 3.64
Receiving any sort of benefit or subsidy
(1=Yes) 975 0.23 786 0.16 189 0.51
Being a member of a non-profit organization
related to disability 975 0.14 786 0.06 189 0.46
Vocational training courses (1=Yes) 975 0.16 786 0.14 189 0.25
Illiterate or without studies 975 0.13 786 0.12 189 0.17
Primary Level and Compulsory Secondary
Level 975 0.57 786 0.56 189 0.61
Non-compulsory Secondary Level 975 0.08 786 0.08 189 0.08
Vocational Training 975 0.06 786 0.07 189 0.05
University or Postgraduate Studies 975 0.15 786 0.16 189 0.08
Region: South 975 0.20 786 0.20 189 0.19
Region: East Coast 975 0.25 786 0.24 189 0.27
Region: North Coast 975 0.16 786 0.16 189 0.17
Region: Ebro River 975 0.07 786 0.06 189 0.08
Region: Centre (Castilla and Madrid) 975 0.26 786 0.27 189 0.24
Region: Balearic and Canary Islands 975 0.06 786 0.07 189 0.05
Empl. Prom.: Training contract (1=Yes) 975 0.03 786 0.00 189 0.16
Empl. Prom.: Fiscal incentives for contracts 975 0.04 786 0.00 189 0.19
Empl. Prom.: Quota in the public sector 975 0.02 786 0.00 189 0.10
Empl. Prom.: Quota in the private sector 975 0.03 786 0.00 189 0.16
Empl. Prom.: Special help for re-entry in the
labour market 975 0.01 786 0.00 189 0.05
Empl. Prom.: Subsidies 975 0.01 786 0.00 189 0.04
Empl. Prom.: Sheltered employment centres 975 0.05 786 0.00 189 0.28
Empl. Prom.: Beneficiary of any of the
previous measures 975 0.18 786 0.00 189 0.91
User of specialized labour market intermedia-
tion (1=Yes) 975 0.09 786 0.00 189 0.48
Beneficiary of employment promotion
measures or specialized labour intermediation 975 0.19 786 0.00 189 1.00
Source: EDDES-1999 and authors’ calculations. Standard deviations are in parentheses.